"trustmark" is necessary. 6 Maturing methods and practices that combine persistent document-level detective controls (mechanism to detect alteration) and preventive controls (mechanism to prevent alteration), applied to electronic documents issued from trusted or authoritative official sources, best enable contemporary demands for open government and a digital economy and in a manner consistent with the foundational common law trust framework. Furthermore, these electronic information assurance methods are well positioned to providing the most effective techniques in meeting evidentiary self-authentication requirements.
Common law foundations
"Be ye ever so high, the law is above you" 7
Document trust framework
An instructive record of early common law methods for creating reliable official paper documents is contained in Justice and Sheriff, 8 a book well known to generations of New Hampshire attorneys. Justice Bell quotes an early nineteenth century New Hampshire law that addresses a fundamental trust issue with paper documents -forgery:
If any person shall falsely make or counterfeit, or fraudulently alter any public record, any writ process or proceeding of any court of this State; any certificate or attestation of a justice of the peace, notary public, clerk of any court, town clerk or other public officer, in any matter wherein such certificate or attestation may be received as legal proof…with intent that any person may be defrauded, he shall be punished by solitary imprisonment not exceeding six months, and by confinement to hard labor not less than three years nor more than seven years. 9 The common law trust framework for official paper documents historically has consisted of certificates, signatures, and seals from reliable sources (i.e. judges, sheriffs, justices of the peace, notaries public, and constables). It is interesting to observe that the book contains 62 references to seal usage, 48 references to official certificates, and 42 references to signatures by hand.
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Document authentication
Digital evidence is subject to the same admissibility tests as paper records.
11 The Federal Rules of Evidence and the evidence rules of nearly every state provide that "[t]the requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims."
12 However, the ephemeral nature of digital evidence and the ease with which digital objects can be undetectably modified make the problem of authentication much more complex than that of paper records and consequently even more critical in an electronic judicial system and digital economy. 13 There are two primary proof hurdles for authenticating digital documents -authenticity (origin and integrity) and reliability.
14 Authenticity requires proof of origin (identification of the creator or authorized signer), content integrity (whether the document has been altered since its creation), and the time the assertion or attestation was made, executed, or issued. 15 A critical part of the authentication inquiry is whether effective safeguards have been implemented 6 National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace, [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] ("To maintain trustmark integrity, the trustmark itself must be resistant to tampering and forgery, participants should be able to both visually and electronically validate its authenticity."). (Anchor Books, 2005) MASON, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE, at § § 4.08, 4.10, 4.19, 4.25. by a reliable or trustworthy source to assure the continuing accuracy and integrity of the originally created record. 16 Thus identity, integrity, and time, recognized as the three main components of authenticity, must be implemented in a fashion that will allow strong tests, or verifiable proof, in the future when authentication is required as a prerequisite for admissibility or should questions of authenticity arise.
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A successful argument to establish a foundation of authenticity relies on a combination of extrinsic controls such as application and system access controls and audit logs, and intrinsic controls, such as encryption, time stamping, and digital signatures.
18 It should be noted that arguing authenticity solely through the use of extrinsic controls is complex and costly, and involves establishing the reliability of several external controls to the document systems and applications over time. On the other hand, the use of intrinsic content-level controls to prevent modification (such as encryption), to prevent and log access and use (for example document rights management), 19 and to detect modification (by the use of time stamps and digital signatures), provide a strong argument for the foundation of authenticity that does not depend on the reliability of external systems, other than those required to apply the intrinsic controls.
Self-Authentication
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the evidence rules of nearly every state, public documents under seal are admitted without further proof.
20 Specifically, FED. R. EVID. 902(1) requires that documents under seal of a public officer, including a judge, be treated as selfauthenticating. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence recognized that the risk of forgery is reduced by the requirement of authentication by a public officer who possesses and affixes a seal.
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Authentication of a document under seal involves the inference of three items: (1) the public officer is who he or she claims to be and is trusted; (2) the signature and seal are genuine; and (3) the signature and seal were affixed by the named public officer. 22 The seal must be kept under the exclusive possession and control of the public officer and not be used by any unauthorized person.
23 Therefore, sole control over the seal is required, whether in the manner of exclusive possessory control with a physical seal or strong access control in the case of an electronic seal.
Because an official act under seal is self-proving, both paper and electronic documents with a completed official certificate are rendered self-authenticating and admissible in court on their face. 24 The evidentiary effect of self-authentication is to permit admissibility by creating a rebuttable presumption of the authenticity of the document. 25 In addition to removing the need for a testifying witness, self-authentication also shifts the evidential burden to the opposing party of challenging the authenticity of the document.
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Digital trust framework: The authoritative source record "Authoritative source record" refers to the official version issued by a reliable and mandated source, the TO EVIDENCE , 902; ME. R. EVID. 902; MD. R. 5-902; MICH. R. EVID. 902; MINN. R. EVID. 902; MISS. R. EVID. 902 ; MONT. R. EVID 902; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-90; N.H. R. EVID. 902; N.J. R. EVID. 902; N.M. R. EVID. 902; N.C. GEN. STAT. §8C-9-902; N.D. R. EVID. 902; OHIO R. EVID. 902; OKLA. STAT. TIT. 12 § 2902; OR. R. EVID. 902; PA. R. EVID. 902; R.I. R. EVID. 902; S.C. R. EVID. 902; S.D. R. EVID. 19-17-2 AND 19-17-9 A., 284 Kan. 853 (2007) ; Thompson v. Shell Western E&P Inc., 607 So.2d 37, 40 (Miss. 1992); Dencer v. Erb, 142 N.J. Eq. 422, 426 (Ch. 1948); Chianese v. Meier, 285 A.D.2d 314, 320, 729 N.Y.S.2d 460, 466 (1st Dept 2001) to be what it purported to be at the time the assertion or attestation was made, an order executed or, more generally, e-mail was sent, contract was signed, report approved).
The persistent authenticity and control of an authoritative source record is based on intrinsic detective and preventive control mechanisms. A public officer declares an authoritative source record by the application of an intrinsic document-level mechanism such as a digital signature, an electronic seal, or time stamp. The authoritative source record is independent of the file container in which it is preserved. 28 The declaration event, which is an important component of the creation of an authoritative source record, cryptographically binds the document to its metadata, security and retention policies, trusted time, and source.
The authoritative source record is self-contained and self-verifiable and does not depend on any external system or application to determine its authenticity. This assumes the technology behind the creation of the record has been deemed reliable to a specific assurance level by an independent and credible third party.
The application of any required confidentiality or access and use restrictions is an intrinsic property of an authoritative source record. The court's document rights management policy aims to ensure persistent protection and control of the official act after it is created. Most importantly, usage rights prevent those individuals that have been granted rights of access from performing functions that may pose a risk (such as copying or printing). Access and usage rights are dynamic and can be immediately revoked or changed by the court at any time. This ensures that the generating public officer or court can, at all times, provide continual protection and dynamic content-level control and full audibility, even while the document is under the logical control of another individual or entity.
Official electronic signature: authoritative signature "Caesar had his Brutus; Charles the First his Cromwell; and George III may profit by their example" 29
System-Controlled signature
Digitally signing court orders with a high assurance digital certificate and time stamp has the effect of establishing each record as a "reference" or "authoritative source record" for relying parties. 30 This ensures the ability to test the authenticity and reliability of the information that was intended to be the equivalent of a paper "original."
31 Although the federal Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act ("E-SIGN") exempts court orders and filings from its scope, 32 the widely enacted Uniform Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA") 33 signatures including court orders and electronic filings in both state and local federal courts. 34 In addition, UETA authorizes courts to specify the form of electronic signatures to be used. 35 Under UETA, authentication of the origin and contents of a document to a particular individual is termed "attribution". 36 While not requiring the use of any one method to prove that an electronic signature is attributable to a person or document, the UETA importantly provides that attribution may be proved by means of a security procedure. 37 A certified official act performed in the manner of a security procedure both attributes the signature to the authorized person and renders the document self-proving. 38 As defined by section 2(14) of UETA, a security procedure is:
A procedure employed for the purpose of verifying that an electronic signature, record, or performance is that of a specific person or for detecting changes or errors in the information in an electronic record. The term includes a procedure that requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, encryption, or callback or other acknowledgment procedures.
Just as in the paper world, the signing act or certification by an official authenticates document by proving attribution of the electronic signature and document to the authorized signatory. Since that first event, Judge Facciola has been digitally signing official court orders. "The capability to sign electronically an order or other document should create in the people who see it an assurance that the document was signed by the judge and eliminate corrupt attempts to use forged, electronically created documents for improper ends," said Judge Facciola. 41 The judicial use of digital signatures in signing court orders signals a ground breaking opportunity for U.S. courts which, despite the widespread use of electronic filing systems, still require handwritten signatures by judges on paper. The ability to implement reliable digital signatures for court filings deals with this problem, while providing the legal confidence necessary to rely on documents that have been signed electronically.
Although the federal courts nationwide have made great strides in enabling the e-filing of pleadings, in the minds of many legal experts, they are overdue for a reliable, end-to-end electronic process that includes signing. In fact, otherwise efficient and cost-effective processes break down from a security viewpoint when paper-based signatures are required. Currently, in most courts only a "/s/" or typed name is needed for an electronic signature. "A fully electronic filing system --that includes electronic [digital] assurance signing credential and process 43 comprising of a secure storage device containing the private key over which Judge Facciola has sole control by means of a two factor authentication process; a digital certificate based on strong in person identity vetting; a trusted time stamp from an accredited source; and a signing and rendering (viewing) application that provides any relying party with the ability to easily verify the authenticity of the order. 44 The judge's signing credential is issued and secured in accordance with an assurance level equivalent or greater to what the United States federal authorities refer to as Medium Assurance Hardware --Federal Bridge Cross Certified.
45 That certification level is based on a high standard of reliability defined by the Federal PKI Management Authority.
A critical prerequisite before any digitally signed record should be relied upon is the verification of its authenticity. This is achieved by validating the digital signature which is accomplished by most applications by simply opening the document. The important validation questions are: whether the document has changed since it was signed, when was it signed, and whether it was signed by the person indicated in the digital certificate. Unfortunately, the process of reaching a judgment on the authenticity of a digitally signed document is still complex, because it is in part based on making a judgment on whether the digital certificate of the signatory was reliable at the time of signing. This is achieved by verifying the status of the digital certificate at the time of signing. 46 In order to make it easy for relying parties to validate a digital signature, the objective should ideally be that they do not need to know anything [e.g., about PKI] or do anything such as make configuration changes to their signing application or make any judgments about whether to trust the certificate and its source.
For validation to be automatic, critical information relating to the trust to be given to the document must already be included in the signature itself and the application in which the document is created, which is beyond the scope of this article. 47 It is possible to achieve this by using the current improvements of the most recent versions of the relevant application (for instance, Adobe). Ideally, the signature validation process should simply involve two steps -opening the document and looking for the "valid" indication icon that states the document is authentic (normally a green check mark). Any actions beyond this are more than the relying party should be expected to do. This assumes that the operational reliability of the issuing Certificate Authority can be determined and meets a specific assurance level. The reliability of the Certificate Authority is in part defined by its governing Certificate Policy or Certificate Practice Statement and independent third party audit assessments. 48 In the case of Judge Facciola, this trust level issue was established through the issuance of a Medium Assurance Hardware Federal Bridge Cross Certified signing credential, which has a prescribed and verified high level of assurance designed to mitigate forgery. Medlin, 201 B.R. 188, 192 (E.D. Tenn. 1996) Osborn v. Kemp, (Del. Ch. 8-20-2009) Briggs v. Glass, 420 So.2d 46, 47 (Ala. 1982); Fares v. Morrison, 54 Cal.App.2d 773, 775 (1942); Westmoreland v. Tallent, 274 Ga. 172, 174 (2001); Curtis v. Curtis, 75 N.E.2d 881 (Ill. 1949); Valeriano-Cruz v. Neth, 14 Neb.App. 855, 861 (2006); Smith v. Smith, 44 A.D.3d 1081 (NY 3d Dept 2007 Inc. v. Hendricks, 51 Wis.2d 579 (1971) .
Minnesota e-Charging service
program in St. Louis County for electronically preparing, signing, filing, and approving all criminal charging documents. 49 On June 30, 2010, the Minnesota Supreme Court approved the program for state-wide implementation with adoption of enabling amendments to the criminal procedure rules. 50 Criminal charging documents are now being signed, notarized, and filed electronically and in real time. Using the Minnesota Criminal Justice Data Network, system controlled digital signatures are used by the police officer, the notary (before whom the police officer signs the charging document under oath), the prosecutor, and the judge. The eCharging Service has resulted in an increase in the accuracy of entering the date entry, a reduction in lost police officer time spent traveling great distances to court, and a reduction in delays in holding individuals pending the decision to file a complaint and then obtaining approval from the court.
Illinois Orders of Protection
Since 2006, the Kane County Circuit Court in Illinois has been electronically processing and issuing domestic restraining orders or "Orders of Protection."
51 Utilizing the ease of use of the web and automated routing, a request for an order of protection can be initiated electronically by representatives of domestic violence victims, court personnel, attorneys, or victims themselves at one of four locations -the courthouse, the clerk's office, the sheriff's office, or a domestic victim's shelter. Regardless of who originates the order request, the forms then need to be acted upon by a judge, court clerk, and sheriff, all of whom sign with a digital signature. The clerk electronically certifies and stamps the finalized orders with a device controlled by the system before sending the orders to the sheriff. Because of the automated process, an order signed by a judge is instantly received by the sheriff's office. The Kane County Circuit Court has experienced a five-fold reduction in the time it takes to submit and process restraining orders.
Official electronic certificate: reliable record "Sic semper tyrannis"
52
Document integrity
As public officers, the official acts and certificates of judges and court clerks enjoy an evidentiary presumption of having been validly performed. 53 Accordingly, in the absence of rebuttal evidence, the official certificate or signature is self-proving, and the document is received into evidence without further proof of the official's authority or seal. 54 However, the certificate is not effective unless the signature and seal of the official are affixed. 55 The certificate, to which the official's signature and seal are affixed, provides prima facie or presumptive evidence of all attested facts including the identity and attribution of the principal.
56
With a quasi-judicial or notarial act, successful rebuttal requires clear and convincing evidence by a disinterested witness of lack of physical appearance, failure to verify identify of the signer, or fraud. 57 An international e-document authenticity standard has emerged for an electronic public document that reflects the evidentiary need for electronic documents to have the capability of testing the authenticity of the document. 58 This standard requires that any relying party be able to verify the origin and integrity of the electronic public document. 59 Establishing the authenticity of an electronic judicial order thus requires the capability, in perpetuity, of independently authenticating the origin of the document, and verifying whether the content of the electronic document is complete and unaltered. When the electronic official certification process is performed in the manner of a security procedure, by incorporating encryption or similar technology, subsequent changes to the electronic signatures and document can be detected.
60
Case studies
Virginia Circuit Court Clerks 61
Effective July, 2010, circuit court clerks in Virginia, who already had court e-filing and land title e-recording capabilities, may now issue official certificates and certified records electronically of any document maintained by the clerk. This marks the first time the circuit court clerks will be sending electronic official documents outside the court system's managed environment. In addition, the circuit court clerks may specify the security procedures, as defined by UETA 2(14), for attorneys to electronically file signed or notarized documents. 62 For an officially certified electronic document, the circuit court clerks use a digital signature and seal to enable detection of subsequent unauthorized alterations. Intrinsic document-level controls are required to enable dynamic and constant security of the document outside of the managed environment.
63
Secretaries of State -Certificates of Authority
When a document executed in one jurisdiction is to be submitted in a court or office of another state or foreign jurisdiction, certification of the notary's identity and official status with a Certificate of Authority or an apostille may be required as a prerequisite for that document to be recognized or received into evidence in the other court or office.
64 State, county, and judicial officials have the legal obligation, when requested, to verify the authority of a notarial officer.
Standards for electronic Certificates of Authority have been established by the National Association of Secretaries of State ("NASS"). To maintain functional equivalence with certified public documents, including notarized documents, NASS has determined that certified electronic public documents and notarizations must meet certain basic requirements to ensure nonrepudiation: the fact of the issuance of the certification must be independently verifiable and the certification must be invalidated if the underlying document is improperly modified.
65 Virginia and Delaware have enacted laws requiring that their respective Secretaries of State issue electronic certifications and apostilles under the secure electronic seal of the state. 66 The source of the document (the secretary of state's office), as reflected in the secretary's electronic signature and seal, must be capable of independent verification and the certificate must be invalidated if the underlying document is modified.
Kansas Secretary of State -Electronic Apostille Program
To effectuate legal recognition of notarized documents 49 57 For instance, see Colburn v. Mid-State Homes, Inc., 266 So.2d 865 (Ala. 1972 ) (the acknowledgment is conclusive of the facts therein absent proof of fraud or duress); Witt v. Panek, 97 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ill. 1951) Land, Inc. v. Montange, 257 N.W.2d 516 (Iowa 1977); Jensen v. Skibiski, 28 So.2d 328 (Fl. 1947 ) (being a quasi-judicial act, the acknowledgment is conclusive of the facts therein absent proof of fraud or duress); Murdock v. Nelms, 212 Va. 639, 641 (1972) 
Document level control
The seal is a particular sign or written mark made to attest the formal execution of a document.
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Information contained in the seal identifies the individual as a duly appointed public officer imbued with authority to perform official acts. 74 The seal authenticates or attributes the official act as the act of a notary.
75 The seal appears in one of four forms: 1) impressed or embossed sign, 2) imprinted or stamped sign, and 3) handwritten (scrolled) or typed mark, and 4) electronic image.
76
By attaching the seal information to an electronic document in a manner that enables an independent verification of the officer, and provides a mechanism to demonstrate whether the document has been tampered with, the evidentiary function of rendering documents self-authenticating is preserved. 77 PROCEDURE § 1930; MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-201; OR. REV. STAT. § 42.110; Van Den Borre v. State, 596 So.2d 687, 691 (Fla. App. 4. Dist. 1992); and King v. Guynes, 42 So. 959,960 (La. 1907) For court e-filing purposes, Wisconsin requires notaries to only use electronic signatures and seals issued by the court. 91 The electronic signing credentials and seals are confidential and must remain under the notary's exclusive control. Consistent with the common law trust framework for paper documents, the digital signature and seal from the electronic filing system satisfy the self-authentication provisions.
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The Electronic Seal or Trustmark: logical extension of common law trust framework "Sigillum est cera impressa; quia cera, sine impressione non est sigillum."
93
The creation of an authoritative source record produced through 1) the application of a digital seal or trustmark as the intrinsic detective control and 2) the application of a rights management policy as the intrinsic protective control, allows a court to provide its relying parties with a self verifying authentication method and to constantly dictate who has access to the authoritative source record, when it may be viewed or when it expires, and what may or may not be done with the record. Thus the information can be transmitted across the internet without the risk of modification or unauthorized access.
Officially certified electronic documents generated with "detective controls" (mechanisms to detect but not prevent unauthorized alterations) such as digital signatures, trustmarks, or trusted time stamps offer several benefits -for example, the ability to verify the source and authenticity of the document, the ability to prove that the document is what it purported to be from the time the assertion was made (that is, when the order was signed, the court record was attested, the contract was executed, or the approval was given), the ability to preserve relevant evidence such as access and usage activity and intrinsically derived chain of custody, and the ability to authenticate the document under the Federal Rules of Evidence without requiring that the organization's information management systems be demonstrated to be reliable, except those involved in the application of the detective controls such as digital signatures and preventive controls (mechanisms to prevent unauthorized access) such as encryption and document rights management technology.
Officially certified electronic documents generated with intrinsic document-level "preventive controls" measurably reduce the risks related to unintended disclosure or unauthorized access, since even if these undesirable events occur, the information remains protected and under control. These preventive controls are also dynamic in that access and usage rights that are initially granted can be changed over time and with immediate effect. In addition, access to the most current document can be ensured even if outdated versions have already been distributed. Methods in the United States for issuing officially certified electronic documents and judicial orders or, as referred to in this article, as authoritative source records, integrate both detective and preventive control technologies to enable official electronic documents to have persistent and dynamic content level protection and control irrespective of where they are located or under whose control they are.
